By Mark Freeman.
As New Zealand’s digital identification system is being set up, it’s useful to examine the case study of India, which has had such a system for over 15 years. What has the Indian experience of digital ID been like? In particular, what are the risks of such a system?
The Indian system, called Aadhaar, is the world’s largest biometric ID system. Its centralised database was introduced in 2010, and now around 95% of India’s population have Aadhaar IDs. To get their ID numbers and cards, people give demographic and biometric data, undergoing scans of their irises and fingers, and, more recently, face authentication.
One stated aim of the Aadhaar system is to allow more people—especially the poor—to access government services, such as food rations, and bank accounts. Other aims include increased convenience and elimination of fraud through fake identifies. However, there are major downsides to the system.
ID effectively compulsory
Having an Aadhaar number is not mandatory, but in effect it’s now essential for most Indian people. “Aadhaar was supposed to be voluntary, but it quickly became clear that living without it would be very difficult for most. Today, it is as good as compulsory. Most social benefits are out of reach without Aadhaar,” says a group of concerned Indian citizens and organisations called Progressive International. The Guardian reports that Indians need Aadhaar numbers to buy houses or cars, get jobs, open bank accounts, receive government benefits, get sim cards and admit children into school.
An Indian privacy and technology researcher, Usha Ramanathan, says Indian people are bullied and scared into getting an Aadhaar ID. Once you’re in the system, you can’t opt out, she says.
Exclusion
Millions of Indian workers have been excluded from food rations and other welfare benefits because of authentication failures in Aadhaar. It’s claimed that a number of Indians have died of starvation because they couldn’t connect their food rationing cards to Aadhaar. The Tribune newspaper says the exclusions are not isolated glitches but rather systemic flaws disproportionately affecting marginalised people.
Security risks
The Aadhaar system has experienced many security breaches of data. In one incident in 2018, the details of 1.1 billion Indians on the database were found to be being sold online.
Mass surveillance
Another major concern is that Aadhaar enables mass surveillance. The Indian government is creating a searchable database that will track every aspect of residents’ lives. An investigation by HuffPost in 2020 found the system will automatically track when citizens move between cities, change jobs, buy new property and register when family members are born, get married or die. In October 2025, the database was not yet complete.
However, the Indian government is already conducting mass surveillance on its citizens. The Central Monitoring System, launched in 2013, lawfully intercepts people’s private conservations according to threat perception. In December 2025, the Indian government ordered telecommunications companies to preinstall a government app on mobile phones made in, or imported into, India. One politician called it a snooping app.
Aadhaar vs. New Zealand’s digital ID system
New Zealand’s emerging digital ID system has stronger privacy protections on paper than Aadhaar. While Aadhaar is a centralised government system, New Zealand’s ID system will be mostly decentralised, giving people more control of their data. The data will be stored in an app on users’ devices.
However, the Indian system gives us clues about the potential dangers of the New Zealand system.
Effectively compulsory
Aadhaar started as voluntary service but is now effectively mandatory. This could happen here. New Zealand privacy watchdog PILLAR predicts that in future essential services like welfare, driver licences and banking will only be accessible through digital ID. New Zealand First has introduced a private member’s bill to ensure physical identification remains a valid alternative to digital ID.
Security risks
Even though New Zealand’s system is not centralised, like Aadhaar, it still poses risks of privacy breaches. The system’s authentication system runs on the US-based cloud infrastructure of Microsoft Azure and Amazon AWS. Both companies are subject to US law, including US government surveillance capabilities.
Exclusion
Similar to India, people in New Zealand who are on low incomes, who are without compatible smartphones or who choose not to get a digital ID could be marginalised. “Access to essential services should never depend on whether someone adopts a government digital ID,” says PILLAR’s executive director Nathan Seiuli.
Surveillance and monitoring potential
Also as in India, use of digital IDs in New Zealand could lead to increased state surveillance since repeated ID use will produce a trail of metadata of users’ actions. The New Zealand government is already sharing our intercepted communications with other “Five Eyes” nations; we don’t need to give them more of our data.
For more information on New Zealand’s digital identification system, see here.